Moving embedded lattice solitons

It was recently proved that isolated unstable "embedded lattice solitons" (ELS) may exist in discrete systems. The discovery of these ELS gives rise to relevant questions such as the following: are there continuous families of ELS?, can ELS be stable?, is it possible for ELS to move along the lattice?, how do ELS interact?. The present work addresses these questions by showing that a novel differential-difference equation (a discrete version of a complex mKdV equation) has a two-parameter continuous family of exact ELS. The numerical tests reveal that these solitons are stable and robust enough to withstand collisions. The model may apply to the description of a Bose-Einstein condensate with dipole-dipole interactions between the atoms, trapped in a deep optical-lattice potential.Comment: 13 pages, 11 figure

Magnetic and orbital order in overdoped bilayer manganites

The magnetic and orbital orders for the bilayer manganites in the doping region $0.5 < x <1.0$ have been investigated from a model that incorporates the two $e_g$ orbitals at each Mn site, the inter-orbital Coulomb interaction and lattice distortions. The usual double exchange operates via the $e_g$ orbitals. It is shown that such a model reproduces much of the phase diagram recently obtained for the bilayer systems in this range of doping. The C-type phase with ($\pi,0,\pi$) spin order seen by Ling et al. appears as a natural consequence of the layered geometry and is stabilised by the static distortions of the system. The orbital order is shown to drive the magnetic order while the anisotropic hopping across the $e_g$ orbitals, layered nature of the underlying structure and associated static distortions largely determine the orbital arrangements.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figure

Information Security as Strategic (In)effectivity

Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself, but rather a means of preventing potential attackers from compromising the correct behavior of the system. To formalize this, we first show how two information flows can be compared by looking at the adversary's ability to harm the system. Then, we propose that the information flow in a system is effectively information-secure if it does not allow for more harm than its idealized variant based on the classical notion of noninterference